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Post by Jan Nieuwenhuijs on Jul 27, 2017 17:23:20 GMT
Hi all, For a while I've been thinking about what exactly happened from 1933 until, say, 1950 when the US went off the gold standard (internally, the dollar was still redeemable for gold for foreign central banks until 1971) and subsequently imported roughly 18,000 tonnes in monetary gold. Reading documents from the Fed from that era is not easy for me as I'm not an economist. My first question is: how did the US devalue the dollar by 70 % against gold in 1933/1934? April 5, 1933, all convertibility into gold was suspended and private holdings of gold were nationalised - people had to sell their gold at $20.67 to the Fed. page 10 gold-standard.procon.org/sourcefiles/crs-brief-history-of-gold-standard-in-us.pdf Somewhere late 1933 the gold price in dollars started to rise, starting at $20.67, and by February 1, 1934, the price had reached $35. This must have happened in the international market IMO. Did the Fed create any money to raise the price? Or could it just place, without a lot of money creation, bids and asks in markets to step by step elevate the peg until $35 was reached? J
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Post by JP (admin) on Jul 28, 2017 1:35:30 GMT
Hi Koos, There are two gold prices, the official one and the market one. By mid 1933 Roosevelt had taken the U.S. off the gold standard, although the official gold price was still at its old level of $20.67. In October 1933 Roosevelt began to buy gold at prices above that level. He had soon bid the market price of gold into the $30s. He used the Reconstruction Finance Corp, not the Fed to do the buying. So he would not have been creating new money to do the buying, since only the Fed creates new money. He bought in limited amounts, according to Scott Sumner, the evidence of this being that the international price did not converge to the U.S. price. The January 31, 1934 event was a re-establishment of the gold standard at a new official price of $35. The peg was maintained by having the Treasury buy all gold at a price of $35 from foreigners and mines. However, once this gold was bought the Treasury could write a gold certificate and deposit it at the Fed, getting new deposits in return. So in essence the peg was financed by Fed money creation, just as it had been from the founding of the Fed until mid-1933.
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Post by Jan Nieuwenhuijs on Jul 28, 2017 14:03:38 GMT
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Post by JP (admin) on Jul 28, 2017 17:39:47 GMT
Ah, Frank Graham. Not a fan of the gold standard. He advocated a commodity basket approach to money, if I recall correctly.
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Post by Jan Nieuwenhuijs on Jul 29, 2017 11:12:39 GMT
I can't tell you anything can I? ;-)
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Post by Jan Nieuwenhuijs on Sept 7, 2017 8:04:02 GMT
Another question I can't get my head around.
Graham first writes on page 4 gold purchasing power increased over '100 years', which he finds remarkable but is likely due to technological development that made commodities cheaper to produce. The resulting deflation (denominated in gold) is clear to me.
But then he writes on page 5, “the purchasing power of an ounce of gold in 1920 was … less than a third of what it is today [in 1939]” . Here I'm thinking if the devaluation of the dollar vs gold (20.67 - 35) had a side effect of increasing gold's purchasing power. My first logic tells me that if one devalues anything but gold, for example the dollar, gold's purchasing power versus commodities would remain equal. Or did the devaluations of the GBP (1931) and USD (1933) and gold's new fixed parity to the dollar in international markets drive up gold's purchasing power 'internationally'?
J
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Post by Jan Nieuwenhuijs on Sept 7, 2017 13:40:15 GMT
O wait. I get it. Initially (months/years), prices (denominated in the devalued currency) aren't affected and so goods & services become cheaper denominated in gold. Until the prices correct for the damage done by the artificial manoeuvre. After a few years prices are likely to go up and goods & services come more or less "equal" to gold. If I'm not mistaken this chart shows, (i) deflation in GBP=XAU is the 1920s, (ii) an increase in gold's purchasing power after 1931 - when the GBP was dismantled from XAU and devalued against it, (iii) gold purchasing power correcting down from 1935 until 1971, etc. pbs.twimg.com/media/C7br6yNXkAAw-zD.jpg:large
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Post by JP (admin) on Sept 7, 2017 13:57:17 GMT
Another question I can't get my head around. Graham first writes on page 4 gold purchasing power increased over '100 years', which he finds remarkable but is likely due to technological development that made commodities cheaper to produce. The resulting deflation (denominated in gold) is clear to me. But then he writes on page 5, “the purchasing power of an ounce of gold in 1920 was … less than a third of what it is today [in 1939]” . Here I'm thinking if the devaluation of the dollar vs gold (20.67 - 35) had a side effect of increasing gold's purchasing power. My first logic tells me that if one devalues anything but gold, for example the dollar, gold's purchasing power versus commodities would remain equal. Or did the devaluations of the GBP (1931) and USD (1933) and gold's new fixed parity to the dollar in international markets drive up gold's purchasing power 'internationally'? Be careful. Graham finds the rise in gold's purchasing power remarkable because it happened while major technological developments in mining were occurring. Technology meant more gold coming out of the ground, which all-things-staying-the-same should lead to gold's value--or its purchasing power--falling, not rising. In a nation on a gold standard, this would cause inflation, not deflation. But surprisingly enough, gold's purchasing power actually increased over the 100 years he describes, i.e. a steady deflation occurred in gold standard nations. As for his points about gold volatility on page 5, David Glasner has written some interesting stuff about gold's behaviour during WWI. When nations suspended the gold standard, the demand for gold declined. This happened for two reasons. The requirement for gold as backing for the money supply disappeared(replaced by war-time financing) as did the necessity of buying gold to issue gold coins. Secondly, governments actively suppressed the private demand for gold. So most actors became sellers during the war. Thus gold's purchasing power steadily declined, reaching a bottom in 1920 or so. Which is the date that Graham brings up as being "far less than any of the years mentioned." Graham then says that the purchasing power of gold rose by 2/3 until 1939. Did the devaluations have something to do with that? A devaluation could not have increased gold's purchasing power for more than a short period because prices would soon adjust, restoring gold to its pre-devaluation purchasing power. One caveat is that consumer goods and services prices are generally sticky and cannot be arbitraged (i.e. think hair cuts) so "short" could mean several years. But prices of tradeables and durables would adjust very quickly. What may have driven the price of gold up from 1920 was the reverse of WWI. Nations were all trying to restore the gold standard, so they once again became buyers. When nations left the gold standard between 1931-1933, one would expect a return to the WWI experience (i.e. a fall in gold demand and declining purchasing power of gold), but that didn't seem to happen... which may be why Graham says that there is a gold problem.
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Post by Jan Nieuwenhuijs on Sept 7, 2017 14:11:41 GMT
Ok. So matters are not that simple huh... But I think I know enough. Muchos gracias senior JP!
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Post by Jan Nieuwenhuijs on Aug 12, 2019 7:39:18 GMT
Ok, one final short question. Why do you think China sold gold in the 1930s? (I like to be more confident on this)
Graham writes:
'For hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years the demand for gold in the Orient was so large and constant that the East was referred to as a “sink for the precious metals.” Since 1930, however, the Orient has been not a sink but a spigot. Hoarding has given way to dishoarding; in the early ’thirties a billion and a half dollars’ worth of gold poured out of India and China and was added to the stocks of gold available in world markets. … In other words, a usual source of demand has, in recent years, turned into a source of supply.'
Did they sell before the US devalued? Or after? Was it because other nations like the UK also devalued against gold?
Did China sell gold for fiat simply because they thought that after devaluations of fiat this fiat had bottomed vs gold?
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Post by JP (admin) on Aug 28, 2019 14:37:45 GMT
Hi Jan.
I don't know for sure.
One theory behind the Great Depression is that it was the result of a huge increase in the demand for gold by the Bank of France, and this spread to other European central banks and the public. So it may not be so much that China didn't want gold in the 1930s. It may be the case that the West wanted it so badly that for once China ceased being the marginal buyer.
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Post by Jan Nieuwenhuijs on Dec 22, 2019 0:48:39 GMT
What about this theory... (Yes, I'm still thinking about why India and China became gold sellers in the 1930s. I'm writing an article about it and like to be sure.) When in 1929 countries started to abandon the gold standard, to devalue against gold, did that push up the "international gold price"? It would right? This would explain a lot. China was on a silver standard until 1935. After 1929 the gold price dominated in yuan started rising (just like the gold silver ratio, btw). Maybe Chinese people sold some gold simply because the gold price in yuan went up? Same with India. In 1931 the rupee gold price went up (because the UK devalued against gold?), and then it fell again, only to raise again in 1934 (because the US devalued against gold?). drive.google.com/open?id=18osb-LoDN1TJeA2-mvEUzPr6QVUnzuGTI know all over the world people sold gold in the 1930s. Maybe for the simple reason its price had gone up, and by 1934 the US guaranteed to buy all gold in exchange for $35 dollars an ounce.
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Post by Roger Sparks on Dec 28, 2019 15:30:05 GMT
I'd like to see this discussion continued.
MY mind went to a land owner who, in 1928, sold land on a contract specifying a price in either dollars or gold. Then, by 1934, along comes government and offers to buy gold for $35 an ounce. Now, the land owner can only go with the flow, but how does this ratio change influence decisions of the purchaser?
My quickly reasoned answer would be "very little". Assuming the land is being paid for by raising wheat, the purchaser just keeps growing wheat, selling it for as much as the market will pay. If the changed ratio brings a higher wheat price, purchaser is the winner.
Thinking about this from another aspect, labor is a renewable resource. Land owners (farmers) trade labor for dollars as they operate the farm. Land owners sell for the reasons they sell, while buyers (if farmers) buy to trade future labor for future dollars. Still assuming a wheat farm, how does the dollar/gold ratio matter?
To close this comment, I'll just say that I am having a hard time finding links between value and any one resource (money is a resource). All resources are linked but the exchange ratios seem to be incredibly flexible.
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Post by Jan Nieuwenhuijs on Dec 28, 2019 15:59:53 GMT
I found some more stuff. In Britain and the Indian Currency Crisis, 1930-2, B. R. Tomlinson writes (Rs. stands for Rupee):
"With sterling and the rupee depreciated it was now possible to sell gold in London at a considerable profit, and large amounts of commodity gold began to be exported from India. Between September 1931 and March 1932 Rs. 629 million worth of gold left private hoards in India and was sold in London. … The flow continued for the rest of the decade—between September 1931 and March I939 India's net exports of gold totalled Rs. 3,072 million (£230.97 million) worth [~1,000 tonnes], … Gold was the preferred savings medium of the vast bulk of the Indian population [hence, India had always been a “sink” for gold]. … The gold exports effectively solved the problems of Indian currency and finance, strengthening India's balance-of-payments surplus on private account and, in I932-3, giving it a visible balance-of-payments surplus with Britain for the first time this century."
So indeed, when India went off the gold standrad the India population sold some of their gold.
For China the situation was different because it was on a silver standrad. The global great depression lowered the silver price, and thus depreciated yuan.
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